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Unlike his theory of justice as fairness, John Rawls’s political liberalism
has generally been spared from critiques regarding what is due to the dis-
abled. This paper demonstrates that, due to the account of the basic ideas
of society and persons provided by Rawls, political liberalism requires
that the interests of numerous individuals with disabilities should be put
aside when the most fundamental issues of justice are settled. The aim is
to accommodate within public reason the due concern for the disabled
while upholding political liberalism. To achieve this aim, a revision of
the basic ideas of persons and society is proposed. The idea of persons
should be regarded as more fundamental than that of social cooperation,
and persons should be deﬁned in terms of minimal moral powers.
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1. Introduction
The justice claims of the disabled have been a source of powerful
criticisms against John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness, which is most
thoroughly articulated in A Theory of Justice (1971).1 Famously, the transi-
tion from A Theory of Justice to the later Political Liberalism (1993) is
marked by important changes in Rawls’s thought. In A Theory of Justice,
Rawls develops justice as fairness, which is regarded as a comprehensive
doctrine (Rawls 1971). In Political Liberalism, the central question
becomes whether, given the current pluralism of incompatible yet reason-
able comprehensive doctrines, a just society can also be stable. According
to Rawls, stability is made possible by the fact that the most diverse
comprehensive doctrines ‘overlap’ on some basic political ideas. Therefore,
there is room for the ‘reason of the public’ to emerge and settle the most
fundamental issues of justice on a broadly consensual basis. In this context,
justice as fairness becomes one of several liberal conceptions of justice that
share the content of the overlapping consensus and, therefore, make up the
public reason of our societies (Rawls 1993).
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Despite the great attention that has been paid to Political Liberalism, the
implications that the shifts in Rawls’s thought have for the claims of the dis-
abled have been surprisingly neglected.2 The ﬁrst aim of this paper, therefore,
is to ﬁll this gap. Giving priority to the basic idea of social cooperation over
that of persons, Rawls’s political liberalism cannot accommodate the justice
claims of many individuals with disabilities without signiﬁcant revisions.
The implications of the failure of Rawls’s political liberalism to accom-
modate the claims of the disabled reach far beyond Rawlsian interpretation.
Political liberalism faces the challenges posed by the pluralism characteriz-
ing our societies, and its search for spaces of overlapping consensus high-
lights a precious source of legitimacy and stability. Thus, the inability of
Rawls’ political liberalism to include individuals with disability is a serious
blow to a model that, in other respects, is worth our support. Accordingly,
the second aim of this paper is to propose an amendment to Rawls’ con-
ception of overlapping consensus and public reason that, though upholding
the project of political liberalism, is able to accommodate what is due to
individuals with disabilities.
This paper is organized as follows. After outlining the main principles
of Rawls’s political liberalism, I show how the basic ideas of society and
persons on which public reason relies require that the interests of many
individuals with disabilities should be set aside when the most fundamental
political decisions are made.3 To complete my argument that Rawls’s politi-
cal liberalism cannot recognize the status of many individuals with disabili-
ties, I argue that no extension of Rawls’s theory can possibly solve the
problem, and that the claims of the disabled must be regarded as a matter
of political justice. Then, I turn to the revision of political liberalism. The
starting point of my proposal is the recognition that a concern for the jus-
tice claims of the disabled is part of the common culture of our societies.
Given that this recognition is inconsistent with Rawls’s portrait of the basic
ideas of society and persons, different basic ideas must be identiﬁed. A
possible route is to follow Christie Hartley and widen the idea of social
cooperation in such a way that virtually all individuals with disabilities are
able to contribute to the extent that is needed to qualify as citizens. After
pointing to the ﬂaws in Hartley’s model, I argue that Martha Nussbaum’s
claim that the conception of persons should be more fundamental than that
of society is more convincing. Nonetheless, Nussbaum’s conception of
persons as centred on a determinate list of capabilities is object of reason-
able disagreement. Therefore, political liberalism should be content with a
deﬁnition of persons as possessing a minimal capacity for moral powers.
2. Legitimacy and consensus in pluralistic societies
Western societies are characterized by a wide disagreement about moral,
religious and philosophical doctrines. Rawls argues that the persistence of
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such disagreement under conditions of freedom shows that, to a good
extent, pluralism is the product of the free exercise of human faculties – in
Rawls’s words, much of the pluralism characterizing our societies is
‘reasonable pluralism’ (Rawls 1993, pp. 54–58).
Political Liberalism aims to demonstrate that, despite the pluralism of
comprehensive doctrines, a fundamentally just society can be legitimate
and stable. Central to Rawls’s argument is the notion of public reason, i.e.
the ideal of legitimacy requiring that, when fundamental political issues are
at stake, decisions should be made on the basis of justiﬁcations that every
reasonable citizen can accept (Rawls 1993, pp. 212–254, Rawls 1997).
Even though reasonable citizens hold different comprehensive doctrines,
such doctrines converge on the most fundamental and abstract parts of a
political conception of justice. Thus, reasons can be public if they are
grounded in this domain of ‘overlapping consensus’ and not on more
comprehensive beliefs.
As for the content of the overlapping consensus, Rawls claims that the
vast majority of citizens living in liberal-democratic societies share a few
basic political ideas: namely, the idea of society as a fair system of cooper-
ation, the idea of citizens as free and equal, reasonable and rational per-
sons, and the idea of a well-ordered society as effectively regulated by a
public conception of justice.4 These widely held ideas provide citizens with
the basis for developing their conceptions of justice. According to Rawls,
the fact that reasonable persons share the same basic political ideas limits
the scope of reasonable disagreement over issues of political justice.
Consequently, the vast majority of citizens have conceptions of justice that
share three key liberal features:
First, a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities (such as those
familiar from constitutional regimes); second, an assignment of special prior-
ity to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially with respect to the
claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and third, measures
ensuring for all citizens adequate all purpose means to make effective use of
their freedom.(Rawls 1997, p. 774)5
To fulﬁl the duty imposed by public reason, it is sufﬁcient that citi-
zens be able to justify their stance on the most fundamental political
issues by reference to their political values alone. This means showing
that their stance is grounded in their liberal conception of justice and can
be traced back to the shared political ideas of society and persons.
According to Rawls, the fulﬁlment of this duty by politically active citi-
zens builds legitimacy in pluralistic societies. Besides, the fact that rea-
sonable citizens endorsing the most various comprehensive doctrines share
the above-listed liberal commitments goes a long way in ensuring the sta-
bility of society.
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3. Public reason and the required disregard for the interests of the
disabled
As mentioned above in the Introduction, Rawls’s justice as fairness has
been the object of numerous criticisms pointing at its inability to take into
consideration the claims of individuals with disabilities.6 However, Rawls’s
theory of justice is not the focus of this paper. In fact, my attention is con-
centrated on the changes in Rawls’s thought leading to Political Liberalism.
In other words, this paper focuses on the Rawlsian account of how a soci-
ety characterized by reasonable pluralism can produce institutions that are
just and stable. In this context, justice as fairness becomes one among the
liberal conceptions of justice falling within the overlapping consensus.
Although Rawls conjectures that justice as fairness might specify the centre
of the class of conceptions falling within the overlapping consensus, he
also states that public reason admits Jürgen Habermas’s discourse ethics
and political Aristotelian–Thomistic conceptions of the common good
(Rawls 1993, pp. 167–168, Rawls 1997, pp. 774–775).
In short, justice as fairness and the twin ideas of public reason and
overlapping consensus provide answers to important but distinct questions.
Therefore, it is surprising that while the place of individuals with disabili-
ties in justice as fairness has been the object of numerous analyses, the
relationship between the claims of the severely disabled and the shifts in
thought leading to Political Liberalism has thus far been neglected. To
show that Rawls’s political liberalism cannot accommodate the claims of
numerous individuals with disabilities, I ﬁrst analyse the ideas of society
and persons that form the basis of overlapping consensus and public
reason. Then, I argue that numerous individuals with disabilities fall outside
the basic idea of persons as deﬁned by Rawls. Finally, I demonstrate that
this exclusion means that citizens and public ofﬁcials are required to leave
the basic interests of the disabled aside when the most fundamental issues
of justice are settled.
On a Rawlsian account of public reason, any public deliberation con-
cerning the liberties, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements of the
disabled should consist of arguments whose normative elements, in the best
judgement of their proponents, can be derived from the basic political ideas
of society and persons. Thus, the question is: can the basic ideas of society
and persons adequately support the interests of individuals with disabilities?
The answer is decidedly ‘No’.
Let me start from the basic idea of persons, given that its emphasis on
the freedom and equality of each citizen seems to involve an inclusive
conception of human dignity, which promises to serve as a good basis for
supporting the interests of individuals with disabilities. According to Rawls,
the individuals who should be regarded as persons are those ﬁtting into the
shared idea of society, which is, therefore, more fundamental.
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Since our account of justice as fairness begins with the idea that society is to
be conceived as a fair system of cooperation over time between generations,
we adopt a conception of the person to go with this idea. Beginning with the
ancient world, the concept of the person has been understood, in both philos-
ophy and law, as the concept of someone who can take part in, or who can
play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights
and duties. Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that
is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life.
(Rawls 1993, p. 18, added emphasis)7
This excerpt shows that it is the ability to play a full role in a fair sys-
tem of cooperation that provides the basis for the value that public reason
attaches to persons. To understand the idea of a fair system of cooperation,
it is necessary to present the notions of reciprocity and rational advantage,
introduced by Rawls to explain fair cooperation (Rawls 1993, pp. 15–22).
Reciprocity means that individuals should derive appropriate beneﬁts from
their contributions to social cooperation, where the appropriateness of bene-
ﬁts is judged with respect to a benchmark of equal distribution of goods.
Now, what kind of beneﬁt is appropriate? When considering the system
from the standpoint of their conception of the good, citizens seek to
advance their own rational advantage, i.e. the amount of the most effective
means of achieving the broadest range of personal goals.
Given the way in which reciprocity and rational advantage are deﬁned,
a fair system of cooperation is concerned with the means that are necessary
for individuals to achieve their goals. More speciﬁcally, those means should
be distributed in such a way that each member of society is better off than
under a regime of equal distribution of goods.8 We can now see why Rawls
needs to deﬁne persons as those who can be normal and fully cooperating
members of society. An idea of persons that can go with Rawls’s idea of a
fair system of cooperation must deﬁne persons as those who can provide a
net beneﬁt to the collective production of goods (wealth being a prime
example) that persons can use to pursue their goals. In fact, the inclusion
of those who fall short of this requirement would hinder the production of
an aggregation of net beneﬁts that is large enough to make each member of
society better off than under a regime of equality.
For the purposes of my argument, it is important that I clarify why
Rawls needs to deﬁne persons as normal and fully cooperating members of
society. Thus, it is important to answer an objection that could be raised
against the explanation I proposed in the previous paragraph. A critic might
argue that including those who fall below a threshold of full cooperation in
a well-organized and otherwise productive system of cooperation would not
make anyone worse off than under a regime of equality. In fact, the
production of a large-enough aggregation of beneﬁts would be under threat
only if the individuals who are not fully cooperating members were much
more numerous than can be expected in actual societies.
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This is a challenging objection, which helps to examine further the
logic behind Rawls’s deﬁnition of persons.9 My answer is that, in deﬁning
the basic ideas of society and persons, our attention should not be limited
to any speciﬁc stage of the evolution of Western economies. In other
words, Rawls’s exclusive idea of persons is needed for his conception of
the basic ideas to apply beyond the speciﬁc stage that has characterized the
recent past of Western economies.
Arguably, much of the appeal of the objection under discussion comes
from the fact that we tend to focus on the generally growing economies
characterizing Western societies since the end of the Second World War.
However, things may well change. What if a period of sustained recession
awaits our economies, leading to a progressive reduction of the value of
production? How about the fact that we live in ageing societies, where
individuals are expected to spend an increasingly large part of their lives in
a state of increased need and diminished productivity? If we take these and
similar considerations into account, it seems that those falling below a
threshold of full cooperation do not have to be in an implausibly large
number to threaten Rawls’s conception of fair cooperation. Hence, Rawls is
justiﬁed in proposing his exclusive idea of persons as grounded in his idea
of fair cooperation.
Before proceeding any further, I need to substantiate a further claim that
plays a major role in my critique of Rawls, namely, the claim that many
individuals with disabilities are bound to fall outside the class of fully
cooperating members of society. Indeed, this claim might seem unjustiﬁed:
according to many disability advocates, much of what individuals with
impairments can or cannot do is a product of the way in which the social
environment is organized.10 In a just social environment, physical and cog-
nitive impairments would not make anyone fall below the threshold of full
cooperation. Therefore, virtually no individual with physical or mental
impairments needs to be placed outside the basic idea of persons as
depicted by Rawls.
My answer to this hypothetical counter-argument is twofold. First, there
are cases in which social reform might enable individuals with impairments
to provide an appropriate beneﬁt to social cooperation, but the cost of the
necessary arrangements would outweigh the output. Let us consider the
example of those severely impaired individuals who need multiple carers to
work (Wolff 2009a, pp. 63–64). They cannot make a contribution to coop-
eration that, in a Rawlsian sense, counts as an appropriate exchange for the
beneﬁt received, because the beneﬁt received will always outweigh the
contribution. So, they cannot be regarded as fully cooperating members of
society and, therefore, they have to be excluded from the basic idea of
persons as presented by Rawls.
Second, there are cases in which the connection between impairment
and disability is so direct that, whatever reform of the social environment
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were put in place (even regardless of its cost), the impaired could never be
fully cooperating members of society. For example, an inclusive social
environment could not compensate for the fact that those who are blind,
affected by chronic pain or suffering from chronic fatigue cannot carry out
as many activities as those who are not (Terzi 2004, pp. 149–153). If these
impairments are serious enough, or if individuals are affected by several of
them, the productivity of workers with impairments is bound to be lower
than needed to be fully cooperating.
As stressed by Jonathan Wolff, these considerations make cognitive
impairments especially resistant to any reform of the social environment
aimed at enabling individuals with impairments to be fully cooperating
members of society. Building on an argument proposed by Daniel Wikler, he
invites consideration of what it would take to make our labour market (and
its legislation) accessible to individuals who, because of cognitive impair-
ments, cannot learn how to read: just the necessary revolution in contract
law would come at an unimaginably high cost (Wolff 2009b, pp. 406–407).
Numerous individuals with disabilities fall outside the category of fully
cooperating members of society. Given that Rawls’s basic ideas of society
and persons state that only those who are fully cooperating members of
society should be regarded as persons, Rawls’s basic ideas cannot be used
to derive any conception of persons that can accommodate those individu-
als with disabilities who fall below the threshold of full cooperation.
Indeed, the basic idea of persons as described by Rawls constitutes only a
subset of any idea of membership that is inclusive towards individuals with
disabilities. Thus, no principle of due respect for the disabled can be
supported from within public reason, because no inclusive conception of
membership can be derived from a basic idea of persons that constitutes
only a subset of the very conception that should be derived.
On a Rawlsian account, no concern with the rights, opportunities and
basic distributive shares of numerous individuals with disabilities should be
regarded as a public reason. This conclusion would already be strikingly
counterintuitive if its main implication was that citizens are allowed to
make their most important political decisions without taking the claims of
individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society into account:
not only could decision-makers neglect the special needs of individuals
with disabilities when institutions are built, but they would also be allowed
to discriminate against such individuals and cast them out from the protec-
tion of pieces of ordinary or constitutional legislation.
Unfortunately, the implications of the exclusion of the interests of
numerous individuals with disabilities from public reason are even more
troubling than described in the previous paragraph: if no case supporting
the status of many individuals with disabilities can be built from within
public reason, citizens and public ofﬁcials are required to leave the inter-
ests of those individuals aside and make the most important political
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decisions on authentically public grounds. In other words, public reason
requires that decision-makers neglect the interests of many individuals with
disabilities when liberties, basic opportunities and fundamental distributive
entitlements are distributed. According to the supposedly liberal conception
of legitimacy proposed by Rawls, citizens and public ofﬁcials who are
attentive to the interests of the disabled when the most fundamental issues
of justice are settled fail to honour public reason.
4. Why Rawls’s political liberalism needs to be revised
The implications of my analysis of Rawls’s political liberalism are intolera-
bly counterintuitive. No society can be said to be shaped by a liberal public
reason if the basic interests of the disabled are not taken into due consider-
ations, let alone if marginalizing those interests is necessary for the institu-
tions to be legitimate. Accordingly, in the next two sections I put forward a
revision of Rawls’s political liberalism that is able to accommodate the
justice claims of individuals with disabilities. Revision, however, is not the
only strategy that can be proposed to solve the difﬁculties of Rawls’s the-
ory. To be sure, Rawls acknowledges that disabilities, at least those disabili-
ties so severe that individuals with them fall below the threshold of normal
productivity over a complete lifetime, cause his theory serious problems
(Rawls 1993, pp. 20–21, Rawls 2001, pp. 168–176). Rawls maintains that
such problems should be addressed at a later stage of the development of
his theory, and he outlines the possible results of that analysis. First, his
model could be so radically incompatible with what is due to the disabled
that its rejection would be justiﬁed. Second, the theory proposed by Rawls
could be extended (perhaps by drawing on complementary ideas proposed
by alternative theories) to cover the case of individuals with serious disabil-
ities. Finally, it could be argued that ‘we should not expect justice as fair-
ness, or any account of justice, to cover all cases of right and wrong.
Political justice needs always to be complemented with other virtues’
(Rawls 1993, p. 21). What is due to individuals who are not fully cooperat-
ing members of society would be a case of right and wrong that does not
fall within the purview of political justice.
Let us consider whether the alternatives to rejection that are outlined by
Rawls can be of any assistance in solving the problems that the claims of
the disabled pose to Rawls’s political liberalism. The proposal that Rawls’s
political liberalism could later be extended to cover the rights, opportunities
and fundamental distributive entitlements of individuals with disabilities is
shown to be untenable by the arguments that I put forward in the previous
section. The problems of public reason vis-à-vis the status of the disabled
spring from what forms the basis of the overlapping consensus, namely the
political ideas of society and persons. If all the normative principles that
should be employed as public reasons must be derivable from an idea of
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social cooperation among fully cooperating human beings, there is simply
no logical room left for the recognition of the status of many individuals
with disabilities. In other words, no possible extension that is consistent
with the basics of the Rawlsian model of public reason could ever solve a
problem that is posed by a structural feature of the model itself.
The only alternative to rejection that is still available, then, is provided
by the idea that the interests of those who are not fully cooperating mem-
bers are not a matter of political justice. Since public reason consists of
arguments grounded in one’s liberal conception of justice, it follows that
what is due to those falling below the threshold of full cooperation is not
for public reason to settle. Instead, we should focus on alternative notions,
like compassion or beneﬁcence, to identify the right set of concepts to
address their claims.
I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice
would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who
fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the
intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are
indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individ-
uals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities pre-
vent them from being a net beneﬁt to social cooperation. They are
individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent
them from providing a beneﬁt to social cooperation that is large enough.
To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in
question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and
moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be
given no rights or opportunities? An afﬁrmative answer would strike us as
implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights,
opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and
the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Raw-
ls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold
of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from
being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else.
In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension
that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include
a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the
proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to
protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only
way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is
due to the disabled.
5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism
The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of
Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while
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upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be
answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political
liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly ﬁts with
our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general
project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism
aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the
basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This
project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legiti-
macy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable
to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies
that are characterized by deep pluralism.
Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into
consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims
of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled
are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our
societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that
rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals
who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall
below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical dis-
abilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social
environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive
beneﬁts that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or
third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of
individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that
the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected
by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not
fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests
neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be
said to ﬁt a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents,
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this
widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all
individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal
fundamental rights.
Reasonable persons agree on less exclusive basic ideas than Rawls
maintains. Thus, my project of revising political liberalism needs to target
the basic ideas of society and persons upon which the overlapping consen-
sus is based. To accomplish this task, I critically analyse two exemplary
attempts to revise the ideas of society and persons as proposed by Rawls:
Hartley’s contractualism and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Although
we need to go beyond both Hartley and Nussbaum, the work of the latter
points us in the right direction.
Hartley’s attempt to revise the ideas of society and persons is, from a
Rawlsian perspective, more conservative. This is because the idea of
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society retains its priority, and persons are still deﬁned as those individuals
ﬁtting into the proposed conception of social cooperation. On this
approach, an extension of the idea of society is employed to secure the
inclusion of individuals with disability. According to Hartley, contractual-
ism revolves around the notion of reciprocity, and reciprocity only requires
that persons make some contribution to social cooperation in exchange for
what they receive. Thus, Rawls is mistaken in claiming that only fully
cooperating members of society should be regarded as persons. In fact, vir-
tually all individuals with disabilities can join the exchange of contributions
that is sufﬁcient for reciprocity (Hartley 2009a, 2009b).
As for the individuals whose disabilities do not affect the two moral
powers, they all can contribute to social cooperation and, therefore, should
be regarded as persons.
For example, by voting and taking part in policy discussions, they can con-
tribute to the political sphere. These individuals can also make cooperative
contributions to the family, an institution that is part of the basic structure.
These contributions include providing support and companionship to others,
participating in family decision making, and helping children obtain the skills
and values they will need as adult citizens. By treating other members of
society with respect in civil society, they contribute to building the social
bases of self-respect. (Hartley 2009a, p. 27)
Besides, apart from those with the most severe mental disabilities, even
the cognitively disabled who lack the two moral powers can make coopera-
tive contributions to society. Even when they cannot contribute to the econ-
omy, individuals with mental disabilities provide family members and
caregivers with companionship, which in turn brings love and support.
Further, individuals who lack the two moral powers can help others
develop important values, such as patience, compassion and humility.
Finally, Hartley employs an argument proposed by Anita Silvers and Leslie
Francis (Silvers and Francis 2005): the inclusion of the most vulnerable
strengthens a climate of trust, which is necessary for the stability of any
cooperative activity.
Hartley does not say whether her contractualism is consistent with
political liberalism or not. Nonetheless, I have introduced Hartley’s contrac-
tualism because it constitutes the most well-developed version of a way of
revising Rawls’s basic ideas that may be employed to amend political liber-
alism. Thus, the question is: does Hartley’s contractualism provide a solid
ground for the revision of political liberalism? To support a negative
answer, I put forward a twofold argument: both the quality and the quantity
of the contributions that, according to Hartley, sufﬁce for membership are
highly problematic.
First, Hartley’s account of the quality of contributions that the disabled
can make is in tension with political liberalism and its search for basic
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ideas that are shared by all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Here we
are investigating what cooperative contributions are sufﬁcient for someone
to be regarded as a person by a political liberalism resting on the idea of
fair cooperation. Thus, those cooperative contributions must be regarded as
valuable by all reasonable citizens, irrespective of their moral, religious,
and philosophical views. In other words, contributions that are held in little
or no regard by any reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot deﬁne fair
cooperation and, in turn, membership in society. The rationale underlying
this constraint is simple: if the cooperative contributions deﬁning who is a
member of society encompassed activities whose desirability is an object of
reasonable disagreement, the basic idea of society as a fair system of coop-
eration would not be the focus of an overlapping consensus any more.
From within political liberalism, one cannot argue that the ability to per-
form an activity makes someone a person if there is reasonable disagree-
ment as to whether that activity is desirable and, therefore, should count as
a positive contribution to social cooperation.
Let us start from the ability to actively participate in the political
sphere: this kind of contribution may be held in little or no regard by rea-
sonable citizens and, therefore, cannot be used as a public reason support-
ing the inclusion of individuals with disabilities. Although universal
suffrage and an inclusive right to political participation fall within the
objects of overlapping consensus, the idea that the actual exercise of politi-
cal rights is valuable appears to be the object of reasonable disagreement.
Political liberalism is different from a comprehensive liberalism in that it
makes no reference to controversial conceptions of the good life or perfec-
tionist virtues. Thus, the overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines
includes those persons who, liberal in their commitment to securing the
right to political participation to those who are willing to use it, hold the
exercise of such value in little regard.
Analogously, regarding the ability to develop patience, compassion and
humility in our fellow citizens as a valuable contribution to cooperation is
in deep tension with political liberalism. Patience and humility are not
regarded as virtues by all reasonable persons, and these character traits are
not needed to respect the basic rights, opportunities and distributive entitle-
ments of fellow citizens. Besides, great compassion is hardly necessary to
support the commitment to the most fundamental interests of our fellow
citizens that is required by political liberalism.
Lastly, the capacity to provide others with love and support is not a
contribution that all reasonable persons, regardless of their comprehensive
doctrines, place importance on. Whether we should build any close bond
with others is a matter pertaining to each person’s conception of the good
and an object of disagreement among reasonable persons. There are persons
pursuing a great degree of emotional self-sufﬁciency and self-reliance in
their relationships with others. Consequently, they do not place much
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importance on the capacity of others to provide love and support. Impor-
tantly, this part of the conception of the good endorsed by the ‘emotional
self-reliant’ is not inconsistent with reasonableness and a commitment to
fair terms of cooperation at the political level.
Unlike the contributions that have just been analysed, the desirability of
a climate of trust and the value of the social basis of respect are not objects
of reasonable disagreement: arguably, all reasonable persons wish not to be
targets of disrespect and all the activities we place importance on need a
climate of trust to be stable. Nonetheless, helping to build the social bases
of respect and a climate of trust constitutes a contribution of a special kind,
such that the inclusion of the disabled in this enterprise does not add much
to public goods that would be sufﬁciently secured by the cooperation of
the non-disabled. This is a ﬁrst problem with the quantity of contributions
that should be considered against the background of a greater quantity-
related difﬁculty, which comes down to the idea of reciprocity itself.
As well as Rawls, Hartley places reciprocity at the core of the idea of
society. Also the way in which reciprocity is deﬁned follows Rawls’s lead:
reciprocity is a relationship of mutuality in which every participant receives
an appropriate beneﬁt judged with respect to a benchmark of equality
(Hartley 2009a, p. 19). As I argued against Rawls in the third section,
cooperation based on reciprocity is still concerned with the production of
an aggregate of net beneﬁts that is large enough to provide every partici-
pant with greater advantages than would be received under an equal distri-
bution of rights, opportunities, income and positions. Moreover, my
analysis of the quality-related difﬁculties of Hartley’s proposal has demon-
strated that, as long as we wish to uphold political liberalism, we cannot
accept a ‘moralized’ account of the beneﬁts of social cooperation including,
for example, political participation, emotional support and the development
of humility in our fellow citizens.
Thus, social cooperation based on reciprocity is in tension with the
inclusion of those human beings who are not fully cooperating members of
society because their inclusion would interfere with the production of a
large-enough aggregation of net beneﬁts. As argued in the third section,
many individuals with disabilities do not count as fully cooperating mem-
bers. Consequently, Hartley fails in her attempt to devise a contractualist
model that is inclusive towards the disabled.
My twofold criticism has led us to the core of the problem with Hart-
ley’s (and Rawls’s) theory. In brief, the claim that the idea of society is
more fundamental than the idea of persons is inconsistent with the actual
content of the overlapping consensus, which includes a principle of due
respect for the disabled as citizens. The project of broadening the idea of
social cooperation does not solve the problem because the inclusion of
numerous individuals with disabilities still threatens the point of social
cooperation.
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Accordingly, I claim that the ordering of the ideas that form the basis
of the overlapping consensus should be reversed: the idea of persons
should be regarded as forming the ultimate basis of the common culture of
our societies, while social cooperation is aimed at serving the interests of
persons. This ordering, which is in line with the liberal common sense that
society should serve individuals (and not vice versa), means that no
individual can be excluded from membership because of their inability to
contribute adequately to social cooperation. The claim that the idea of per-
sons should be considered as the most fundamental is the starting point of
Nussbaum’s revision of the basic ideas as proposed by Rawls.
6. Revising political liberalism II: beyond Nussbaum’s capabilities
approach
Although springing from a criticism that is limited to Rawls’s justice as
fairness, Nussbaum’s revision of the basic ideas of society and persons is
presented as an object of overlapping consensus among reasonable compre-
hensive doctrines. According to Nussbaum, a full account of human per-
sonality and a thick idea of the good should be the starting points of any
reasonable conception of justice. Thus, any such conception should con-
ceive of the members of society as benevolent towards any other human
being and loving justice in itself. Human beings are social animals, and the
construction of social interactions is part of their conception of the good.
Moreover, any account of justice should be based on a conception of
human personality that acknowledges that animal needs deﬁne human nat-
ure as much as our rational powers.
A fully human life is deﬁned by a list of capabilities that any just soci-
ety should strive to secure for its members: developing our practical reason
is as important as living to the end of a healthy life, having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction, forming
emotional attachments or being able to laugh and play. As long as individu-
als have the ability to perform several of such deﬁning features of human
life, they qualify as persons and thus deserve full political status. Conse-
quently, justice requires that individuals with serious physical and mental
disabilities enjoy the protection of the law and have their needs met in the
same way as ‘normal’ citizens. Moreover, the fulﬁlment of the needs of
others is part of the very conception of the good that all reasonable persons
pursue by cooperating in society. Thus, the conﬂict between the advantages
that should be received in exchange for our contribution and the fact that
some members cannot normally contribute is minimized (Nussbaum 2006,
pp. 155–223).
I argue that Nussbaum’s proposal does not ﬁt within the project of
political liberalism because it rests on a comprehensive account of human
personality that is object of disagreement between reasonable doctrines.
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Even though Nussbaum maintains that her theory of justice can be the
object of overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, grounding justice on a thick conception of the good and of human
personality is tantamount to rejecting political liberalism in favour of a
comprehensive alternative. In a political liberalism, the aim pursued by the
twin ideas of overlapping consensus and public reason is to include a wide
variety of comprehensive doctrines in a democratic dialogue that can give
legitimacy and stability to institutions. If the bases for any public reason
were the conception of the good and that of human personality as depicted
by Nussbaum, too many comprehensive doctrines would be left outside of
this democratic dialogue.13
To begin with, many persons do not share the absolute benevolence
towards others that Nussbaum places within any reasonable conception of
the good. Moreover, the project to deﬁne a fully human life is bound to
create sharp disagreement among those comprehensive doctrines that politi-
cal liberalism aims to include in the overlapping consensus. This project
needs to answer questions concerning the place of sexual satisfaction,
reproductive freedom, strong emotional attachments and even recreational
activities in human life. Any answer that is given to them will contradict
important comprehensive doctrines. For example, in any society there are
citizens holding traditionalist religious beliefs who would never agree that
a fulﬁlled human life should be deﬁned in terms of our capability to laugh
and play, let alone sexual satisfaction and reproductive freedom. Given that
these persons of faith can be strict in matters of recreation and sexual con-
duct without wishing to reform the basic rights of others, they should be
allowed into the dialogue that builds legitimacy and stability in our plural-
istic societies. On the contrary, Nussbaum’s model requires that the world-
views that do not agree on her list of capabilities should be excluded from
the overlapping consensus. Consequently, the range of comprehensive doc-
trines that can engage in dialogue on the basis of public reason is severely
restricted, defeating the purpose of political liberalism.
We need to go beyond Nussbaum to identify a basic idea of persons
that is shared by the reasonable comprehensive doctrines ﬂourishing in our
societies. However, going beyond Nussbaum should not involve dismissing
all the aspects of her idea of persons. In fact, as shown by the widespread
concern for the basic interests of individuals with severe mental disabilities,
there is overlapping consensus on the idea that the full possession of ratio-
nality and reasonableness is not necessary to be regarded as a person.
The similarities between my portrait of the basic idea of persons and
Nussbaum’s account of human personality, however, end here. My concep-
tion of the basic idea of persons cannot be nearly as articulated as Nuss-
baum’s. Indeed, any attempt to identify the multiple features that deﬁne
human personhood is bound to draw on intellectual resources provided by
some controversial comprehensive doctrine. However, the basic idea of
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persons must be given more content, so that it can provide guidance when
the most basic issues of justice are discussed.
Here political liberalism is caught between two conﬂicting requirements,
and ﬁnding a solution to this conﬂict is a difﬁcult task. Nonetheless, I
believe that Rawls’s account of reasonableness and rationality can be used
as a starting point for developing a satisfactory deﬁnition of my basic idea
of persons (Rawls 1993, pp. 48–58). In brief, the ideas of reasonableness
and rationality should be stretched as much as possible, reaching well
beyond the limits set by Rawls. Thus, persons should be deﬁned as those
individuals who are in possession of the resulting versions of reasonable-
ness and rationality, which may be called ‘minimal moral powers’.14
First, this process entails the search for a component of Rawls’s idea of
reasonableness that is shared by all of the individuals I aim to include in
the idea of persons. Such a component cannot be the ability to appreciate
the burdens of judgement and their consequences for public reasoning.
Analogously, we should drop the idea that persons can engage in a conver-
sation as to whether a policy proposal is acceptable to all. Indeed, many
individuals with cognitive disabilities I aim to include in the basic idea of
persons are not reasonable in either sense. However, a component of Raw-
ls’s idea of reasonableness can still be used to include the cognitively dis-
abled within the idea of persons. Thus, ‘minimally reasonable’ persons can
be deﬁned as those individuals who perceive at least some blatant cases of
wrongdoing as such. Besides, they show some appropriate reaction, such as
rejection or repulsion, in the face of those cases. Let us take a case of
unprovoked violence. If that occurred in front of their eyes, many individu-
als with severe cognitive disabilities would react in a way showing an
understanding that something different should have happened.
Turning to the component of Rawls’s idea of rationality that all persons
possess, we should drop the notion that persons revise their ends in the
light of the rest of their conception of the good. We should also drop the
idea that persons choose the most effective means to their ends, and select
the most probable alternative. Hence, ‘minimally rational’ persons are to be
deﬁned as those individuals who have ends or interests of their own. In
addition, they desire that at least some of their ends or interests are
fulﬁlled. In other words, they show a willingness to perform actions that
satisfy some of their ends or, at least, they want to have those ends satisﬁed
by means of actions that someone else can perform. As in the case of mini-
mal reasonableness, minimal rationality is a requirement that a large num-
ber of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities can meet, for example
with regard to such ends as nutrition, affection and relief from suffering.
Thus, the possession of minimal moral powers is ﬁt for deﬁning persons in
a political liberalism that is inclusive towards the disabled. This proposal
avoids drawing on controversial ideas provided by any comprehensive
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doctrine, as it does not attempt to articulate a deﬁnition of what constitutes
a human life.
It is now time to address an important objection to my argument. In the
ﬁfth section, the idea that the disabled are persons was said to be part of
the common culture of our societies, and I have just claimed that all rea-
sonable doctrines agree upon a conception of persons as possessing mini-
mal moral powers. Now, what is the evidence for all this? This is a
difﬁcult question, which can be asked of any attempt to deﬁne the basic
ideas that all reasonable doctrines share, including Rawls’s attempt. Argu-
ably, no survey of what actual persons think could ever provide an answer.
We are investigating what reasonable persons agree upon, and reasonable-
ness is a normative element that is not satisﬁed by all actual persons.
Instead, a good way to answer is to identify the methods used by Rawls to
support his own conception of the content of the overlapping consensus.
My aim is to show that Rawls’s methods can actually be employed to
support my revision of political liberalism.
First, Rawls puts forward model examples of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines. He examines what they have in common to answer questions
about the depth of the overlapping consensus, the extent to which respect-
ing public reason is a matter of compromise, and the like. Rawls’s model
case of overlapping consensus contains a doctrine deriving its commitment
to toleration and equality among persons from religious beliefs; a Kantian
comprehensive liberalism; a doctrine centred on John Stuart Mill’s idea of
autonomy; and classic utilitarianism (Rawls 1993, pp. 145–146, 159–160,
168–171).
I argue that all model examples of reasonable doctrines would subscribe
to my inclusive conception of persons. The religious doctrine would regard
those with the minimal moral powers as persons because they may have a
role to play in God’s plan, because they bear the image of God, or on the
basis of analogous considerations. Other doctrines would stress that those
with the minimal moral powers are sentient beings (classic utilitarianism),
or beings who add to the variety of walks of life individuals can draw from
(Mill’s liberalism). On the face of it, the Kantian comprehensive doctrine
seems to pose a problem. One might argue that the followers of that doc-
trine would not recognize anyone who is not in full possession of the two
moral powers as a person. In fact, the full possession of the two moral
powers seems necessary to go through the complex mental procedures
associated to the categorical imperative.
I answer that at the centre of a Kantian worldview is an idea of auton-
omy as receptivity of the will to duty qua duty. Importantly, Kant stresses
that what duty requires is generally simple. He goes as far as saying that,
in many cases, children would see what is right more clearly than adults
(Kant 1991, pp. 64–72). Given the stress placed on the simplicity of duty,
it is fair to expect that the Kantian would put a premium on the receptivity
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of individuals to some core cases of wrongdoing. Thus, it is fair to expect
that the Kantian would recognize as persons those individuals who, in
virtue of their minimal moral powers, show repulsion towards (at least)
some blatant cases of wrongdoing.
Let us now consider one further way of providing evidence that can be
borrowed from Rawls. That concerns Rawls’s argument that, in a liberal
society with judicial review, ‘public reason is the reason of its supreme
court’ (Rawls 1993, p. 231). Supreme courts deal exclusively with constitu-
tional essentials and, therefore, are forced by their questions to provide
arguments that are acceptable to a wide variety of perspectives, even
beyond the parties appearing before them. Thus, Rawls suggests looking at
supreme courts when we need to make our ideas about public reason more
deﬁnite.
What Rawls describes as the exemplar of public reason actually relies
on a basic idea of persons that is analogous to mine. For the sake of brev-
ity, let us restrict our attention to the US Supreme Court. Now, the US
Supreme Court has employed for decades an idea of persons that goes well
beyond the full possession of moral powers. Indeed, there have been
numerous cases in which the US Supreme Court has defended the rights of
individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, implying that those
individuals must be regarded as persons when constitutional essentials are
discussed.
For example, consider the case of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
(473 U.S. 432, 1985), in which the Court applied the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to individuals with ‘mental retardation’. In
Olmstead v. L.C. (527 U.S. 581, 1999), the Court ruled that, if certain con-
ditions obtain, the institutional isolation of the cognitively disabled equates
to discrimination, and generic cost considerations are not a valid defence
for failing to provide community placement. In sum, as with the model
case of overlapping consensus, following Rawls’s method has led to the
discovery of evidence supporting my basic idea of persons as possessing
minimal moral powers.
What still needs to be demonstrated is that, besides being supported by
evidence, my basic idea of persons provides what Rawls depicts as the
right answers to the most fundamental issues of justice. According to my
revision of political liberalism, social cooperation is supposed to serve the
basic interests of its members. Now, political liberalism thus understood is
characterized by a focus on the interests of each person and a strong egali-
tarian commitment. Thus, if reasoning on the basis of my basic idea of per-
sons, citizens and public ofﬁcials would subscribe to a list of basic rights,
liberties and opportunities; an assignment of priority to such rights, liberties
and opportunities; and measures ensuring for all citizens all-purpose means
to make effective use of their freedoms (Rawls 1997, pp. 773–775). Most
importantly, my revision of political liberalism succeeds where Rawls’s
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proposal fails, namely in dictating that rights, opportunities and distributive
shares should be granted to those who are not fully cooperating members
of society.
Before concluding, let us consider the case of the disabled who are still
not included in political liberalism. To determine what is due to a class of
individuals, public reason needs reasonable agreement as to whether they
should be regarded as persons or not. Now, there is no agreement between
reasonable persons as to whether personhood should be extended to those
human beings whose mental impairments are so severe that consciousness
is absent and any mental activity is reduced to a minimum. Consequently,
what is due to them cannot fall within the purview of public reason. For
example, consider anencephalic newborns or individuals in persistent vege-
tative state (PVS). When the basic rights, opportunities and distributive
shares of citizens are discussed, the interests of anencephalic newborns or
individuals in PVS should be set aside. What we owe to them should be
addressed at a different stage, when ordinary legislation is formulated.
I argue that this residual exclusion does not pose any serious problem
to political liberalism. Contrast the cases under discussion with the exclu-
sion of individuals with disabilities that is involved in Rawls’s theory: the
idea that the interests of anencephalic newborns or individuals in PVS
should not be considered when the most fundamental issues of justice are
settled does not provoke anything analogous to the shocked reaction pro-
duced by the implications of Rawls’s model. The mental disabilities associ-
ated with anencephaly or PVS prevent human beings from developing
virtually all the features that are prized in human life. Given that the indi-
viduals with such impairments lack virtually any feature that, according to
the most various comprehensive doctrines, contributes to conferring dignity
upon persons, it is acceptable that what is due to them is relegated to a
level of ordinary legislation lying outside the purview of public reason.
7. Conclusion
The general project of Rawls’s political liberalism is compelling. However,
the appeal of this project is greatly diminished by the fact that Rawls’s
public reason cannot accommodate the justice claims of many individuals
with disabilities.
In this paper, I have demonstrated that political liberalism can be
revised so as to be inclusive towards the disabled. A concern for the basic
interests of virtually all individuals with disabilities is part of the common
culture of our societies. This has led me to argue that, according to our
shared reason, the idea of persons is more fundamental than the idea of
society. More speciﬁcally, persons are to be deﬁned as those individuals
with the capacity to exercise their moral powers to a minimal degree.
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Besides being inclusive towards individuals with disabilities, my
account of political liberalism is still able to deliver the Rawlsian promise
of a stable and fundamentally just society under conditions of pluralism.
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Notes
1. For the criticisms attracted by Rawls with regard to the disabled, see Barry
(1995, pp. 28-61), Brighouse (2001, pp. 537-560), Cohen (1995, pp. 224-225),
Hartley (2009a), Kittay (1999, pp. 75-113), Nussbaum (2006, pp. 107-140), and
Silvers and Francis (2005).
2. Evidence of this neglect is provided by the fact that none of the works listed
above in note 1 focuses on what is characteristic of Political Liberalism: the
search for stability under conditions of pluralism, the idea of overlapping con-
sensus and that of public reason are never objects of criticisms. Indeed, if
those works analyse Political Liberalism, it is the treatment of justice as fair-
ness that captures all the attention. Predictably, this neglect is shared by those
who attempt to answer the critiques that are levelled at Rawls with reference
to disability (Becker 2005, Stark 2007, Quong 2007, Richardson 2006, Wong
2007). A notable exception, however, is provided by Silvers and Francis
(2009). After lamenting the lack of analyses of the implications of Rawls’s
shifts in thinking for the status of the disabled, Silvers and Francis argue that
justice as fairness as presented in Political Liberalism still rests on metaphysi-
cal assumptions (that is, it falls outside the overlapping consensus).
3. The terminology here follows the usage according to which ‘impairment’ is a
deviation from normal functioning and ‘disability’ is the lack of ability to do
something in one’s environment.
4. Rawls (1993, pp. 149–150) makes it clear that the overlapping consensus is so
deep that it goes down to the basic political ideas of society and persons. For
the most extensive analysis of such ideas, see Rawls (1993, pp. 15–22, 29–
43).
5. The comprehensive doctrines that share the two basic political ideas and
develop conceptions of justice characterized by the three features listed are
called ‘reasonable’.
6. See note 1.
7. The reference to justice as fairness should not be misleading: even though the
basic ideas of society and persons are ﬁrst introduced in the context of the
analysis of justice as fairness, Rawls (1993, pp. 149–150) makes it clear that
the overlapping consensus among reasonable doctrines is deep enough to
reach these basic ideas.
8. In Rawls’s own words, in a fair system of cooperation ‘everyone beneﬁts
judged with respect to an appropriate benchmark of equality’ (Rawls 1993,
p. 17).
9. The author thanks an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
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10. The claim that disabilities are much more the product of the social environ-
ment than of any impairment is at the core of the so-called ‘social model of
disability’ (Oliver 1996). For a more nuanced defence of the social roots of
disability, see Silvers (1998).
11. To be sure, there are exceptions to this claim. As shown at the end of the sixth
section, there are individuals whose mental disabilities are so severe that there
is reasonable disagreement as to whether or not they should be considered as
persons. In such extreme cases, concepts such as compassion or beneﬁcence
can legitimately be employed instead of political justice.
12. As inclusive as the common culture of our societies may be, there are mental
disabilities that fall outside the shared concern with the basic interests of the
disabled. These cases will be discussed in the sixth section.
13. The criticism here has important points of contact with some of the arguments
employed by Cudd (2004) to demonstrate that Nussbaum’s theory is not
liberal.
14. The author owes much of the analysis of the content of and evidence
supporting his basic idea of persons to a conversation with Valeria Ottonelli.
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